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Abstract
Theories of modernity and risk society argue that increasing levels of risk fun-
damentally alter or lower the level of trust in society. In this article we argue
that this assumption is based in a fallacious theoretical link between trust and
risk. Rather than calculative assessment of risk and specific events, trust directs
anticipation towards process. First, we outline dominant approaches to trust as
a question of actions and uncertainty of outcomes, arguing that these
approaches treat trust and chance as interchangeable, conflating the different
socio-temporalities within which risk and trust, respectively, reside. Secondly,
the issue of temporality is traced in Luhmann’s work on trust and it is demon-
strated how his dichotomous treatment of social time conflates markedly dif-
ferent temporal experiences. As a solution to this, the article presents the
notion of a third temporal mode of the process present from Deleuze’s concept
of becoming. This is theoretically reconnected to the process present to trust
theory, arguing that the uncertainty trust deals with, is connected to process
experience rather than expectations of the future. Finally, we discuss the the-
oretical and empirical consequences of a socio-temporal distinction between
trust and chance, and argue that trusting is an epistemological slip and space of
non-reflexivity, that transform time to process.
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Introduction
Risk and risk society concepts play an important role in sociological theo-
rizing and discussions about modernity. The increased salience of risk
within all social relations is argued to undermine or change trust in other
people. In this paper we argue that this claim is based in a misconceptua-
lization of the trust–risk relationship. Ulrich Beck (1986), Anthony Giddens
(1990) and Niklas Luhmann (1988) are some of the many prominent soci-
ologists who have insisted on the sociological adaption of the concept, to
grasp reﬂexive social processes that produce trust or mistrust in social rela-
tions, social institutions and experts. According to Ulrich Bech modernity
has turned into a risk society where threats to society and individuals are
produced by society and social relations themselves (e.g. terror, environ-
mental disasters or aids). This has led to an increased responsibility of the
individual. Increased knowledge and participation in risk creation have
changed the reﬂexivity of the modern individual and created an uncertain
and ambivalent relation to future: the creation of ‘now’ can lead to the
destruction of ‘future’ (Beck, 1986).
This social fact, however, only gains relevance in the discussions on
trust when assuming that trust is an expectation within a linear tempor-
ality. It is, however, questionable whether it is possible at all to trust in
this sense? This discussion is highly relevant – both empirically and the-
oretically – in relation to the assumption of calculation that immanently
reign risk and trust sociology (Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 1992). Our point is
that this sociological question on trust and risk underemphasise the ques-
tion of ‘now’ (jetzzeit) (Deleuze, 1994; Mead, 1934). Our argument is that
trusting is not to calculate, since future, risk and linear temporality are
abolished in trust. Trust is fundamentally diﬀerent from calculation and,
consequently, trust must be theoretically separated from risk. Our sugges-
tion is that sociology needs to improve its understanding of trust by
incorporating George Mead and Gilles Deleuze as a theoretical criticism
of risk sociology and as a path to emphasise the weakness of risk soci-
ology – the ‘now’. We underline how ﬂow brings us closer to trust as a
process, instead of understanding trust as a static temporal state of mind
that relates to an object and objective reality. Sociologically, it makes
sense to grasp trust as an embodied and temporal event which rests on
uncertainty beyond reﬂexivity. As such we critically confront the risk
sociology of Giddens and Beck and examine a new temporal approach
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to trust, which seeks a new understanding of interpersonal relations of
trust, where process rather than results is the centre of trust.
Turning to the seminal works on trust by Niklas Luhmann (1988, 1979),
James Coleman (1990) and Peter Blau (1964) trust is characterised as a
decision in the face of risk. The probability of undesirable future events is
estimated to ﬁnd reasons either to trust or not to trust. This type of
reasoning has led sociologists to argue that trusting is like a bet or a
gamble (Oﬀe, 1999). However, this probabilistic conception of trust
proves problematic when the issue is reversed. Gambling is clearly not
the same thing as trusting. In the present paper we suggest that this con-
ception of trust is based on a fallacious link between risk and trust, ignoring
the diﬀerent temporalities of trusting or taking a calculated risk.
Building on Luhmann’s (1979) temporal analysis of events and continuity,
we reinvestigate trust and risk as diﬀerent temporal ways of relating to the
potential futures of present interaction. Risk relates to the subjectivity of the
other – alter – as a source of unpredictable action and outcomes with both
transformative and destructive capacity (Heinskou, 2015). Trust, on the
other hand, relates neither to actions nor outcomes, but to the indetermin-
able potential of the Other in the present (Løgstrup, 1997; Seligman, 1997).
Risk is linked to a temporality of decisions and actions driven by the
expectation of potential outcomes, where Luhmann terms the event tem-
porality. However, contrary to Luhmann it is our suggestion that trust
relates to a process temporality: to present becoming, rather than to
events and expected outcomes. Elaborating and discussing possibilities in
Deleuze’s (1994) concept of becoming and Mead’s (1934) philosophy of the
present, we argue that these particular conceptualisations of process in the
present include the core temporality of trust. Luhmann’s notion of the
continuity temporality is characterised by the naturalized permanence and
stability of the institutional and natural environment which is ﬁrmly seated
in the past. This is the temporal mode of trust present in phenomenological
(Brown, 2009; Vaitkus, 1990, 1991) and structuralist (Barber, 1983;
Parsons, 1967) renderings of trust. In contrast, his notion of the event
temporality is seated in the future through the subjects attempt to predict
and project the probability of future events resulting from actions in the
present. This is the temporal mode of trust presented by Luhmann (1979)
and by rational action theory (Coleman, 1982; Hardin, 2002). The process
temporality (or becoming), however, resides in the present. The present is
the paramount form of temporality in which social interaction takes place
and each individual interprets the comportment of other participants. It is
in the present that we can observe things actually happening (as opposed to
recalling or expecting them) (Flaherty and Fine, 2001: 150; Mead, 1934: 1).
Our analysis follows Deleuze’s analysis of becoming as process and Mead’s
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analysis of the present in arguing that trust, in contradistinction to chance,
is an anticipation of a present rather than a speciﬁc expectation of things to
come. Taking this point of departure, we argue that trusting is a process
that resides within the temporality of becoming.
Based on this analysis we argue that contemporary endeavours to ana-
lyse trust as rational or reﬂexive underestimate the signiﬁcance of chance in
relating to the uncertainty of future events. Furthermore, we argue that
trusting is a relation to alterity which directs anticipations towards process
rather than calculating expectations of speciﬁc events.
First, we outline the dominant approaches to trust as a question of
actions and uncertainty of outcomes, arguing that these approaches treat
trust and chance as interchangeable. Secondly, we trace the issue of tem-
porality in Luhmann’s work on trust and demonstrate how his dichotom-
ous treatment of social time conﬂates markedly diﬀerent temporal
experiences. Thirdly, we present the notion of a third temporal mode of
the process present from Deleuze’s concept of becoming. Fourth, we recon-
nect this notion of a process present to trust theory, arguing that the uncer-
tainty trusting deals with is connected to process experience and
anticipation rather than expectations of the future. Fifth, we investigate
two illustrative examples of trust to assess the analytical potential of the
proposed notion of trusting as process. Finally, we discuss the theoretical
and empirical consequences of a socio-temporal distinction between trust
and risk, reconnecting with general sociological discussions on risk and
trust.
Theories of trust and uncertainty
In sociology, trust has been ﬁrmly connected to uncertainty. In Georg
Simmel’s (1950) inﬂuential writings on trust he states that ‘As a hypothesis
regarding future behaviour, a hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for
practical conduct, [trust] is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance
about a man’. This conception of trust contains two important propositions,
of which one may be found in most modern theories of trust.
One proposition is that trust is based on manifestly incomplete know-
ledge and consequently connected to issues of uncertainty. This has been the
main sociological theme in theorising trust.
The other proposition is that trust is a type of expectation and conse-
quently linked with issues of temporality and temporal projections. This
theme has been all but absent from the sociology of trust, with the notable
exception of Luhmann’s work on this subject.
Trust poses a sociological puzzle because people trust others in regard to
some future event despite uncertainty (Mo¨llering, 2001), and, furthermore,
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trust enable people to cooperate with and depend on each other in ways that
seem unwarranted to the observer (Barbalet, 2009). Diﬀerent sociological
traditions have theorised diﬀerent solutions to this puzzle, primarily focus-
ing on the issue of uncertainty.
The functionalist tradition has argued that trust is the expectation that
social order will prevail in some speciﬁc regard due to the perceived ﬁdu-
ciary obligations binding the other (Barber, 1983; Parsons, 1967). In this
rendering, the future actions of the other become predictable – and thus
trustworthy – to the extent that perceived normative restraints on those
actions reduce uncertainty.
Within rational actions theory, James Coleman has proposed a theory of
trust as the result of a rational assessment of probabilities, costs and bene-
ﬁts. Weighing against each other the probabilities of diﬀerent future out-
comes and the potential losses and beneﬁts, the trustor may reach the
decision that trust is or is not worth the risk (Coleman, 1982). Trust, con-
sequently, is conceptualised as a calculable probability range speciﬁc to a
particular situation of risk.
Hardin (2002, 1992) argues from exchange theory that the trusting is best
characterised as perceived, encapsulated interest. Rather than knowing spe-
ciﬁcally what the other will do, encapsulated interest is the expectation that
whatever the trustee does will take into account the interests of the trustor.
The degree to which this encapsulation of interest is grounded in a personal
relationship, objective interests or power structures may vary, but trust is
fundamentally cognitive and consequently based on experience. The trustor
expects his or her interest to be encapsulated in the interest of the trustee
because experience suggests so.
Within phenomenology, Løgstrup’s (1997) and Levinas’ (1979, 1996)
ethical analysis of trust posits that trust is directed towards an ‘other’
and the unfathomable will of this other. Trusting, they argue, does not
depend on a constructed image of the other or the potential futures asso-
ciated with the actions of the other; trusting simply delivers us into the
hands of the other. Both authors anchor trust in the socio-ontological argu-
ment that human intersubjectivity is a prerequisite for subjective experience.
Furthermore, a number of theories have suggested diﬀerent combin-
ations of these three positions as the foundations of trust (Khodyakov,
2007; Kohn, 2008; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Misztal, 1996; Sztompka,
1999; Uslaner, 2002). Predominantly, these theories argue that experience
and emotions combined with institutional and cultural assumptions aug-
ment the rational calculation of probabilities.
What characterises all these many theories of trust is the ‘leap of faith’
from the objectively insuﬃcient grounds for trust into a positive expectation
of future events and actions (Mo¨llering, 2001). It is this characteristic that is
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intriguing: trust can support actions and assumptions where objectiﬁed
knowledge cannot. Trust overcomes uncertainty and enables people to
interact and have expectations of each other that go beyond what is justiﬁed
by the available information. This is what Barbalet (1996) terms the cre-
ativity of trust. Nonetheless, whether based in cognition, rationality, or
socialised norms all of these theories inevitably fail. In diﬀerent ways they
attempt to explain how trust deals with uncertainty by arguing that norms,
experience, human nature or assessment of probabilities somehow cause
uncertainty to disappear. However, this either means that trust is based
on certainty, making the notion of trust meaningless, or that trust is a
gamble, making trust identical to notions of chance. In both cases there
is no need to speak of trust at all since other concepts are more adequate
descriptions.
It is our suggestion that a phenomenological investigation of trust and
uncertainty is called for in order to understand the subjective diﬀerence
between trusting and taking a chance in the face of uncertainty. In order
to conduct such an investigation, it is, however, necessary to recall that
uncertainty is an inherently temporal phenomenon. Consequently, we con-
duct an analysis of chance and trust as diﬀerent temporal experiences of –
and ways of dealing with – uncertainty. The following paragraphs examine
this temporal dynamics of trust, taking Luhmann’s theory of trust and time
as the point of departure.
Trusting the other in the present?
Trust and time
While Simmel conceived trust as an expectation of the future, it is Luhmann
(1979) who wrote the only theory of trust and time, where he presents a
theory of time that connects trust to the phenomenological distinction
between continuity and event. This distinction is used to characterise two
diﬀerent ways of experiencing time. The ﬁrst, continuity, he argues, is the
primordial temporal mode of stable social and physical environment. In a
later revision, Luhmann (1988) speciﬁes that not only the traditional order
of social relations but also social institutions belong to this temporality.
This is the static temporality of reversible time (Levi-Strauss, 1955) in which
past, present and future are identical: that which was still is and will be in
the future. Consequently, temporality is not a diachronic ﬂow but a per-
manent cycle. The other way of experiencing time, according to Luhmann,
is that of the event, in part corresponding to Levi-Strauss’ (1955) notion of
irreversible time. This is the temporality of the time ﬂow in which future
potentialities become present events and subsequently past experience.
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Fundamentally, what Luhmann presents is a phenomenology of diﬀerent
ways of experiencing uncertainty, which underpins and expands the notion
of risk present in Beck’s work on risk and in rational choice theory of trust
and risk. From the temporal distinction Luhmann develops both the risk/
danger distinction and the trust/conﬁdence distinction. The main content of
Luhmann’s temporal analysis is presented in illustration 1.
Illustration 1
The temporality of continuity presents contingency as minimal. Gravity,
bank transfers, ﬂight safety procedures and the intersubjectivity of language
are examples of things experienced as continuous. They are a stable condi-
tion of life; their workings are mostly unknown to us and experienced as
completely independent of our actions and inﬂuence. Luhmann deﬁnes the
fact that such conditions are taken for granted and relied upon completely
as conﬁdence: the pre-reﬂexive expectation that these phenomena will
appear and behave tomorrow as they did yesterday. However, this does
not mean that conﬁdence is complete within continuity. Rather, the threats
and disasters of the past loom equally large in the future. Danger is the
other side of conﬁdence, populating the world with dangerous phenomena
beyond the control of the subject. Ultimately, neither natural disasters nor
tax audits can be controlled or even avoided with any certainty. In this
temporal mode, uncertainty is connected to a lack of knowledge. The
future is not experienced as truly contingent but is only partly unknown
to the subject.
The temporality of events presents uncertainty as immense: an inﬁnite
number of potential futures must eventually result in only one present.
Since events are so strongly connected to uncertainty – the experience of
contingency – they are also reﬂexive. Promotions, illness, exams, buying a
house, or getting married are examples of things experienced as events.
When the subject monitors and navigates the unceasing ﬂow of potential
events, uncertainty becomes both a property of the future and a conse-
quence of present actions. This is the foundation of Luhmann’s (1993)
theory of risk as a state of mind in which present actions are evaluated in
regard to the potential future events they may create. Consequently, a
number of futures are reﬂexively developed from acting and deciding in
Temporality Continuity Event
Domain Structure (Nature/System/Institution) Agent (Agency/Alterity)
Mode of uncertainty Danger Risk
Mode of certainty Confidence Trust
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the present (Reith, 2004). Thus navigating the constant ﬂow of potential
adverse outcomes, risk is a state of mind striving to minimise regrets. The
same temporal analysis of events is at the heart of Luhmann’s trust concept.
Rather than avoiding regrets, however, trust is a way of accepting potential
regrets by acting as if certainty existed despite the knowledge that it does
not (Luhmann, 1979, 1988).
This distinction between the event temporality of trust and risk and the
continuity temporality of conﬁdence and danger is similar to the two tier
model of trust found both in Giddens’ work on trust and in phenomeno-
logical theorising on trust. Drawing on developmental psychology, Giddens
(1990, 1991) suggests that trust in its speciﬁc reﬂexive form is contingent on
a basic trust as continuous ontological certainty. From a phenomenological
point of view, Grøn (2010) similarly argues that trusting in any speciﬁc
intersubjective form always presupposes that we are in trust as a general
way of relating to the world. Trust must be available as a general attitude
regarding the world in order to be instantiated when meeting the other. The
temporal distinction between trust and conﬁdence is a way of separating
these levels of trust and linking them to the phenomenology of time.
However, the temporal distinction is basically a distinction between
agency and structure. According to Levi-Strauss (1955), the reversible time
of continuity is the temporality of social structure of langue, while the irre-
versible time of events is the temporality of agency, of parole. Consequently,
both trust and chance belong to the temporalities of events and agency when
dealing with uncertainty. This leaves two possible ways of distinguishing
trust from chance: either they relate to diﬀerent levels or thresholds of uncer-
tainty or they relate to diﬀerent temporal experiences. The predominant
sociological argument has pursued the uncertainty argument relating trust
and chance to diﬀerent levels of probability and information. However, this
is poorly supported by the fact that people often trust others with what is
most important to them (Frederiksen, 2012) and by the way that trust often
exceeds justiﬁed expectation (Barbalet, 2009). In contrast, our contention is
that trust and chance are fundamentally diﬀerent ways of experiencing tem-
porality: chance is drawn to the potential future and trust is anchored in the
process of the present. Consequently, only chance belongs to Luhmann’s
event temporality while trust is linked to the present only. In the following
we approach Luhmann’s fundamental question of uncertainty, but drawing
on Deleuze’s and Mead’s analysis of present and becoming in deﬁning trust.
Trust as a process of becoming
Deleuze has no concept of trust in his theoretical work, but he is interested
in the relationship of the One and the Many, of univocity and multiplicity.
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Thus, contrary to the phenomenology of Løgstrup and Levinas, there is no
ﬁnite ‘Other’ in Deleuze’s work. Here we ﬁnd a radical aﬃrmation of the
sort of possibilities for becoming that cannot be thought of in logical or
moralistic terms: becoming can only be felt or sensed or conjured, which
requires us to experiment in ways that aﬃrm the vitality, the energies and
the creative animations of existence as a process of trusting a potential
chaos, movement and creativity. Becoming is neither the continuation of
the past in the present and future nor the inﬁnite contingency of future
events. Rather, becoming is the ephemeral promises and potentialities
ingrained and available in any and every present. How does trust relate
to that process?
As such trusting has no ﬁnal object – no deﬁned ‘other’ in becoming – or
what we term process. The ‘other’ may always be both diﬀerent and the
same. In becoming one can achieve an ultimate existential stage in which life
is simply immanent and open to new relations and trajectories. It is endless
becomings or simply aﬀect. Becoming is not a part of history: ‘‘History
amounts only to the set of preconditions, however recent, that one leaves
behind in order to ‘become,’ that is, to create something new’’ (Deleuze,
1994: 171). As such this is not a conservation of the same but the temporal
process of diﬀerence and repetition at the same time. Trusting the other is
embedded in the process of becoming that ties past, present and future
together. This conceptualisation of time brings us to the point that trusting
is – as a becoming – a ‘middle time’: a time in between past, present and
future. Trusting the ‘other’ is born within the present. Trusting does not
involve taking a chance, since this requires reﬂections on possible future risk
and thus transgress the bounds of the present. This ‘middle time’ – or this
present – is fundamentally diﬀerent from the temporality of risk. Risk and
chance are bound to the present, but importantly also bound to possible
future outcomes. Thus risk is directed at the possibility of diﬀerence in itself
– either positive or negative – as an event. Trust, on the other hand, is
bound to the expectation of the variability of diﬀerence within the present
‘now’. The future is irrelevant to trust since trusting is directed at process
temporality of the ‘now’. Further, process – or becoming – breaks with the
time of risk and events – which is, as we remember – bound to the linear and
controlled/regulated temporality of the future and eliminations of uncer-
tainty. This conceptualisation of the temporality of trust follows GHMead,
who points to the importance of the empirical of the present. To quote
Mead:
‘The present is empirical, since it is represented by each new gesture and
utterance in the sequential ﬂow of interaction, but the past and the future
can only be found in memory and anticipation, respectively’ (Mead, 1934: 31)
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What we ﬁnd here is the important notion of the empirical in the present as
a ﬂow of interaction. Pointing towards this ﬂow brings us further to the
process of trusting. But from the Deleuzian‘s point of view this process is
chaotic, and the empirical material and multiple, as we will show in the
illustrative examples below.
Process may be explosive, but the point is that trust as a process is
multiple and has no predeﬁned shape – it is neither linear nor circular
but virtual. To quote Deleuze: ‘The present exists, but the past alone insists
and provides the element in which the present passes and successive presents
are telescoped (Deleuze, 1994: 85). The past is accessible through the vir-
tual, which is telescoped. Put simply, this gap between the past and the
present implies and deﬁnes our ability to creatively respond to a situation
rather than simply habitually react, in O’Sullivan’s (2009) reading of
Deleuze (p. 166). This means, seen in the light of trusting, that trust is
virtual; it is an image that connects past, present and future.
As Deleuze writes:
The account of a gigantic memory, a multiplicity formed by the virtual
co-existence of all the sections of the ‘cone’, each section being the repetition
of all the others . . . the actualization of this mnemonic virtual appears to take
the form of the creation of divergent lines, each of which corresponds to a
virtual section, and represents a manner of solving a problem . . .Diﬀerence
and repetition in the virtual ground the moment of actualization, of diﬀerence
as creation. (Deleuze, 1994: 212)
Importantly, the virtual then is itself a realm of diﬀerence in itself, diﬀerence
undeﬁned by the concept, as it were: chaosmosis, pure multiplicity. Further,
this ground is not really a ground but more an ungrounding (O’Sullivan,
2009: 168), and we should understand the freedom of the non-mediated
ground, the discovery of a ground behind every other ground, the immedi-
ate reﬂection of the formless (Deleuze, 1994: 67). Moreover, these are very
bodily means of discovery. That means that the body becomes the very
means of experimentation and transformation for a given subject – as a
corporeality – as aﬀect. It is giving back the power of nature to the body as
a passage from the virtual to the actual that deﬁnes life in general and any
speciﬁc life when it is lived. Bringing back the body to this process, trust is
not discursive – it is prediscursive – it is an embodied sensation. That entails
that trusting breaks with the Cartesian dualism between reﬂexivity and
body that reigns within risk sociology. Trusting here embrace the partial
connections between reﬂexivity and embodiment as a speciﬁc ‘plateau’ – or
ungrounding, where the embodied sensibility of time makes the material
ground of trusting as an immediate reﬂection of the formless. That is the
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‘ﬂow’ as Mead would put it – that which is making sense of events and
continuity – a chaosmotic nature of process which leaves trusting out of the
linear temporality of trusting. This makes the familiarity of process a com-
petence of trusting.
Suggesting this third socio-temporal dimension of the present – charac-
terised by the experience of process ﬂow – allows us to reconﬁgure
Luhmann’s analysis of temporality and uncertainty (Illustration 2). The
mode of certainty associated with process is neither the ﬁrm stability of
continuity nor the probabilistic experience of things risk to come. Rather,
certainty in process is linked to familiar ﬂows. Being in a state of trust
means to willingly surrender to the ‘rhythm’ – as it were – of the process
rather than to the potential outcome (chance) or total structure (conﬁ-
dence). The process temporality unfolds as the inﬁnite ﬂow of repetition
and diﬀerence within the sequence of situations, requiring agents to inter-
pret the present – the fundamental mode of temporality according to Mead
– in making sense of both events and continuity: past and future. The
interpretation and accompanying anticipation, however, is founded in nei-
ther events nor continuity. Rather, it is founded in the ungrounded – chaos-
motic – nature of process, leaving only inertia as a handle for interpretation.
This leaves us with a tri-part temporal classiﬁcation.
Illustration 2
In the temporality of continuity, stability prevails and the future conse-
quently mirrors the past. In this temporality, certainty in the form of con-
ﬁdence is grounded in this perpetual character of states and process in
nature, systems and institutions. Only when these are themselves a source
of harm does uncertainty surface as danger: both volcanic eruptions and
lay-oﬀs in labour markets do occur, but only by staying away from volca-
noes and precarious labour market positions such calamities can be
avoided.
In the temporality of process, the on-going, unfolding nature of situated
interaction produces a ﬂow or rhythm of repetition and diﬀerence which
sustains an anticipation of continued interaction. The process temporality is
characterised by the directedness of the ﬂow without a speciﬁc purpose or






Mode of uncertainty Danger (Angst) Risk
Mode of certainty Confidence Trust Chance
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end-goal through which to interpret the interaction. Certainty, in this tem-
porality, is connected to trust as being in tune with – or familiar with – the
process ﬂow of the situation. While trust is not directed at a speciﬁc goal, it
anticipates an unthreatening continuation or repetition of the present
because the directedness of the process is familiar and embodied.
Uncertainty emerges with the loss of direction or the increasingly synco-
pated rhythm of the process ﬂow brought on by an imbalance between the
level of repetition and diﬀerence. The means a loss of directedness and of
familiarity which is characteristic to angst as a mode of uncertainty: the
situations and ﬂow of interaction threatens to unravel, dissolving the indi-
vidual in the process (Sørensen, 1960).
Finally, the temporality of events is directed at the future as a reservoir
of potential events. It is a temporal mode in which the subject objectivises
the present as a means to an end: the desirable future outcome. Within the
temporality certainty takes the form of chance: that despite the possibility
of an adverse outcome, probabilities, need, or desire suggests a speciﬁc
course of action in the present to achieve a speciﬁc outcome. Uncertainty
becomes manifest as risk when trying to avoid speciﬁc future outcomes
through strategic action. Both in certainty and uncertainty, the event tem-
porality is characterised by calculativeness and reﬂexivity, in extrapolating
from present actions to future outcomes. This is the temporal mode of risk
society, calling on subjects to reﬂexively assess and calculate the intended
and unintended consequences of actions and devising appropriate
strategies.
Such conceptual distinctions and elaborations are, in the ﬁnal analysis,
only useful if they help hone our tools for analysing the social. In the fol-
lowing we engage with two important examples of trust – one ﬁctional and
one empirical – from the trust literature. The purpose of this is to illustrate
and asses the notion of trust as process and becoming as analytical tool.
The temporal experience of trust and chance
In Russell Hardin’s (2002) work on trust and trust worthiness, he gives an
example meant to illustrate the calculations involved in assessing trust-
worthiness and establishing trust. The example is taken from
Dostoyevsky’s ‘The Brothers Karamazov’ in which a lieutenant-colonel
underhandedly places army funds at the dispositions of the local merchant
Trifonov. Trifonov invests the money and returns them to the lieutenant-
colonel with interest before each regular audit. However, when the lieute-
nant-colonel is suddenly relieved of command Trifonov denies ever having
received any money, leaving the lieutenant-colonel to explain to the audi-
tors what happened to the misappropriated money in his care.
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Hardin’s suggestion is that the mutual trust of the two characters is
based in their respective interest in making the interest of the other char-
acter their own interest, what Hardin deﬁnes as encapsulated interest.
However, since this encapsulation of interest was only relevant as long as
the transaction was ongoing, both should expect the other to betray the
others trust in the last instance. Defection was the rational choice of both
once no further gains were expected.
This rendering of trust requires people to have some notions of the dif-
ferent potential outcomes of diﬀerent actions and to take these into account
in deciding upon a course of action. In other words, it involves risk in
Luhmann’s sense of the monitoring of potential adverse outcomes of pre-
sent actions. In this regard, Hardin’s approach is similar to most of the trust
theories presented above.
Hardin’s example is, however, problematic once we consider the
Lieutenant-colonel’s perspective. According to Hardin, the Lieutenant-
colonel decides to engage in these criminal transactions knowing that
Trifonov would only be trustworthy as long as it was in his own interest
to be so or as long as external institutional structures forced him to behave
honourably. However, it is questionable whether this rendering of trust is
diﬀerent from risk and chance-taking. Engaging in criminal collaboration
would seem to involve risk calculation and chance taking and the example
thus seems to conﬂate these phenomena with trust.
From the process perspective, trust could be an accurate description of
the relationship even though Trifonov defects in the end. Approaching trust
as a sensitivity to – and immersion in – the process of repetition and dif-
ference from which each instance of their relationship emerges, we can
easily imagine a diﬀerent scenario. While their transactions may initially
have been based on calculation, the successful repetition of their illegal
business may have shifted to trust and the process temporality of present
situations. Building their anticipation of the interaction solely on the inertia
of prior interaction will help them sustain a trust relationship. However,
when suddenly the process of repetition and diﬀerence takes an abrupt turn
– the new orders for the Lieutenant-colonel – it substantially changes their
relation and new possibilities and process ﬂows become possible. Trifonov
opportunistically devise a strategy which suits his personal ends better: he
enter the event temporality and seizes the chance of a quick proﬁt.
No ﬁnal, right interpretation exists of such examples. However, compar-
ing the two notions of trust does show that the notion of trust as a process
of present becoming suggest that people may shift between trust and chance
and that trust relationship and the betrayal of trust can meaningfully be
analysed as a sequences of unique situation, which unfolds as diﬀerence and
repetition – chaos and inertia. Approaching trust in this way helps us
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understand why trust so often seems to elude objective analysis and
attempts to explain the reasons for trust: trust makes sense only from
within the ﬂow of the present and only to those participating bodily in
those situations. Even to the same people trust may appear unjustiﬁed or
meaningless in retrospect.
Mo¨llering (2005) provides an empirical example which in many regard is
similar to Hardin’s. Mo¨llering’s analysis of the Lindner–Lafontaine case
show how trust develops and eventually fails within a process of contract
negotiation. The publisher Heiner Lindner negotiated with the German
politician and resigned minister of ﬁnance Oscar Lafontaine on publishing
a biographical book with information of the SPD-led German government.
Lindner later published a diary which conveys his thoughts and reﬂections
throughout the negotiations. The diary shows that Lindner has a pre-
existing relationship with Lafontaine and throughout the negotiations he
perceives this relationship as increasingly close and trustful (Mo¨llering,
2005b). However, as it turns out Lafontaine signs a more lucrative contract
with another publishing house despite promising Lindner the contract.
Consequently, Lindner feels betrayed and deceived. On the one hand, the
relationship between the two seems to develop in a trusting direction:
Lindner is invited to a private birthday with Lafontaine and has an ongoing
private relationship with both Lafontaine and his wife. On the other hand,
the potential conﬂict between their trusting relationship and Lafontaine’s
inevitably having to decide on a publisher seems to loom as a threat to the
relationship. Lindner, on his part, expresses trust in Lafontaine and conﬁ-
dence in the success of their business relationship ‘He (Lafontaine) felt that
I had read the manuscript with a view to letting no harm come to him.
From my perspective an unlimited trust relationship had emerged between
him and me. Lafontaine seems to reciprocate the trust and is consequently
worried that their business negotiations might threaten the relationship:
‘He (Lafontaine) says that he does not want to cause me any harm.
‘‘Look, if the others (publishing houses in the bidding) make a loss of
100,000 marks or more, I do not care. But for you?’’ Also, he points out
that my publishing house is close to the SPD after all. And he did not want
to harm it [the publisher]. Neither did he want me to stretch myself too far’
(Lindner, 1999).
The Lindner–Lafontaine’s example seems to suggest that trust exist des-
pite calculation, not because of it. Lafontaine is clearly worried that the
business decision he has to make will somehow have an adverse impact on
Lindner and on their relationship and use their mutual trust to engage this
issue. Lindner seems to trust Lafontaine profoundly and try to avoid cal-
culating and assessing what eventually will be in Lafontaine’s interest.
Lindner trusts and therefore does not need to consider probabilities and
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potential outcomes but simply anticipates the present to remain stable: that
Lafontaine will remain a trusted friend. Lafontaine’s position is more pre-
carious since he considers Lindner a trusted friend, but the need to make a
decision forces him to consider outcomes and, consequently, for him risk
encroaches on trust.
Hardin’s argument, which is repeated in numerous variations by other
researchers, presents an objectivist account of trusting: the trustor can never
in any ﬁnal way know the intentions of the trustee. Trust, consequently, is a
gamble that one has made a correct assessment of the trustee’s intentions.
The experience of giving other people a second chance or taking a chance
on them in order to achieve some private purpose can appropriately be
described in terms of such a gamble. Trusting, however, is a type of antici-
pation rather than a type of expectation directly based in reﬂexive
assessment.
Initially, the relationship is a ﬂow of interaction between people engaging
in trusting cooperation. However, to Lafontaine it changes once he starts
getting bids from other publishers and he struggles to maintain the rela-
tionship despite the impending business transaction. To Lindner, the rela-
tionship remains trusting and he struggles to avoid losing trust despite
Lafontaine telling him about the other oﬀers, forcing him to increase his
own bid. Once Lafontaine ﬁnally decides on another publishing house,
Lindner’s trust is revoked and he starts to reconsider their relationship
and friendship as a deception: in calculative hindsight risk rather than
trust seems justiﬁed. What was initially trust – a ﬂow of interaction from
which neither of the participants had to extract themselves in order to assess
and calculate expected probabilities – comes to a dramatic halt as risk,
because questions of probabilities and outcomes are forced on the relation-
ship turning past and present actions into evidence from which to extrapo-
late future events. Hardin’s (and Dostoyevsky’s) assumption that Trifonov
intended to deceive all along is consequently problematic. Like Lindners
interpretation of Lafontaine’s actions, it is produced by objectivising hind-
sight, rather than from the experience of being embedded in the process ﬂow
of interaction. The point is that this whether the situation is one of chance
or trust is not a question which can be answered by an outside observer
because it depends on the temporal experience of the situation and the way
in which it unfolds (Author).
Trusting or taking a chance?
In summary we have followed Luhmann’s fundamental question of uncer-
tainty, and explored the temporality of trusting by drawing on Deleuze’s
and Mead’s analysis of present and becoming. We have argued that it may
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be fruitful to investigate the distinction between trust and chance as one of
diﬀerent temporal experiences rather than diﬀerent levels of information.
The instability of trust which becomes apparent through the notion of pre-
sent becoming is helpful in both analysing and describing the complexity
and instability of trust relations. The calculative approach quickly gets
stuck in the quagmire on reﬂexive strategies and second guessing oneself
in trusting. The process approach, however, allows us to analyse the
sequence of situations and the sequence of situated subjectivities, thus open-
ing up the multiplicity and indeterminability of trust. Trust is going on as
trusting – a bodily, situated, and involved responsiveness to the inertia of
process ﬂows.
In conclusion our suggestion is that contemporary and classical sociology
have failed to conceptualise trust in a manner that makes it distinguishable
from issues of risk and chance. Rather, than considering trust and chance as
two diﬀerent ways of dealing with and experiencing the same basic kind of
uncertainty, trust and chance are directed at diﬀerent kinds of uncertainty
and indeterminability. Chance is reﬂexively directed at the potential futures
obtainable through the present, whereas trust is directed at the very ﬂow of
becoming in the present stemming from the tacit experience and sensation of
that ﬂow. This very present of trusting makes it almost impossible to grasp
and evenmore diﬃcult to predict within sociology.When trusting is multiple,
it depends not only on the other but on the multiples of the other and the
heterogeneity of complex situations. As such trusting is an epistemological
slip and a space of non-reﬂexivity. But, most importantly, trusting is empir-
ical. The consequence of this conceptualization of trust is theoretically and
diagnostically critical approach to risk and chance temporalities. It also high-
lights a critique of the theories of modernity that emphasises risk society as a
diagnosis of time. The argument that trust will either become calculative or
simply disappear as a consequence of modernity is fundamentally ﬂawed.
While there is little doubt that risk and calculation within linear time are
indeed increasing, this does not mean that trust is decreasing. On the con-
trary, the temporality of the present seems to have an equally strong hold on
people leaving ample room for trust and trust relations. As we see it newways
of coming to terms with the ambiguities of modernity point towards a need of
being in the present as a way of coping with risk society. Stating this, we see
that the ability of being in the presence of trusting makes a diﬀerence to the
emphasis on reﬂexivity, which traditionally has been highlighted as the cap-
ability of being inmodernity. On the contrary we emphasise the space of non-
reﬂexivity as the space of trusting. This might even lead us to recognize the
growing cultural taste for mindfulness as a pragmatic ability to be fully aware
in the moment (Rosa, 2014). The crucial point here is that the establishing
and preservation of being in the present require a certain level of ability to
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cope with potential risks in an era of incessant social acceleration and in a
world of imperatives of speed and competition. Our suggestion is that soci-
ology would beneﬁt from our temporal diagnosis of trusting, in order to pave
the way for new conceptualizations of a wider ﬁeld of sociology. As men-
tioned above it could be the popularity of mindfulness or it could be political
processes on risk management, just to mention a few. The point is that
trusting is challenging rational processes and demands despite that these
demands need trusting. This brings in a new temporal dilemma tomodernity.
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